Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 3

Article 4

3-1-2013

Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of WalMart v. Dukes
Jennifer Brooks-Crozier

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
19 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 711 (2013).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Brooks-Crozier: Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-M

PUT UP YOUR DUKES: THE FIGHT OVER
COMMONALITY IN THE ERA OF
WAL-MART V. DUKES
By: Jennifer Brooks-Croziert
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.

..................................

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

IN WAL-MART

V.

D U KES ..................................................

A. "A Common Contention Capable of Classwide
Resolution" .........................................
B. 23(b)(2) and Claims for Monetary Relief............
C. Ginsburg's Dissent: Must 23(a)(2) Mean More Than
it Says? ................................

III. THE CONSEQUENCES

OF THE DUKES DECISION.........

A. The Blurring of 23(a) (2) and 23(b)(3) ............
B. Dukes in the Employment Context...... ........
C. Hybrid Classes
.............................
IV. CONCLUSION

........................................
1.

711
712

712
714
716

716
716
724
730
732

INTRODUCTION

1.5 million current and former employees spread out across 3,400
stores across the United States. It would have been, in Justice Scalia's
words, "one of the most expansive class actions ever." 2 But the Supreme Court, in a decision that reverberated through American
courts, refused to certify the class proposed by former Wal-Mart employee Betty Dukes.'
This Article evaluates the impact of Wal-Mart v. Dukes on class action litigation.' Part 11 outlines the Court's analysis and Justice Gins1. Associate, Alston & Bird LLP-Dallas; J.D., high honors, University of Connecticut School of Law; M.A., Indiana University-Bloomington; B.A., Indiana University-Bloomington. The Author dedicates this Article to her mother and father.
She is so grateful to them for their unending support of her every endeavor. The
Author would also like to thank Professor Alexandra Lahav for her encouragement
and thoughtful comments.
2. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
3. Dukes proposed a class of "all women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic
retail store at any time since December 26, 1998" allegedly subject to gender discrimination in pay and promotions. Id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[o]ne or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if
... there are questions of law or fact common to the class." FED, R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
If a purported class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a), which include-in addition to commonality-numerosity, typicality, and adequacy of representation, a
23(b)(2) class action may be maintained if "the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
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burg's dissenting opinion in Dukes. Part III discusses three themes or
issues gleaned from class-action cases post Dukes: (1) the blurring of
the 23(a)(2) commonality and 23(b)(3) predominance standards, with
the result that 23(a)(2), heretofore an "easily satisfied" standard "construed permissively" by courts, is now substantially more difficult to
satisfy; (2) the interpretation of Dukes in the employment context,
with courts using the existence of a general corporate policy (official
or unofficial) to satisfy the Dukes requirement that defendant employers have a common mode of operating upon each employee; and (3)
the use of the 23(c)(4) hybrid class to counter defendants' arguments
that where plaintiffs' claims include those for individualized relief,
Dukes precludes certification of any portion of the case under
23(b)(2).
II.
A.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN WAL-MART

v. DUKES

"A Common Contention Capable of Classwide Resolution"

The Supreme Court's analysis in Dukes centered on the Rule 23
commonality requirement 5-that there must be "questions of law or
fact common to the class."' The Court began by asserting that this
language is "easy to misread."' Not just any common question will
do. For example, "Do all of us plaintiffs work for Wal-Mart?" or "Do
our managers have discretion over pay?" would not satisfy the commonality requirement.' Class members must have "suffered the same
injury," and this means more than that they "suffered a violation of
the same provision of law." 9 Class members' claims, the Court maintained, "must depend upon a common contention-for example, the
assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor,"
and that common contention must be "capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke."'o
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole," and a 23(b)(3) class action may be maintained if "the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2), 23(b)(3).
5. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 ("[Tihe crux of this case is commonality . . .
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

7. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
8. Id.

9. Id. ("Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways-by intentional
discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and
by the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously, the mere claim by employees of the same company that they
have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate-impact Title VII injury, gives no
cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once.").
10. Id. This language is almost universally quoted by courts citing Dukes.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss3/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.2

2

Brooks-Crozier: Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-M

2013]

PUT UP YOUR DUKES

713

In the Title VII context, the Court explained, there are two sets of
circumstances in which a plaintiff could plausibly assert that class
members had "suffered the same injury" within the meaning of Rule
23(a): (1) where the employer had "used a biased testing procedure to
evaluate . . . applicants for employment" or (2) where there was "sig-

nificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of
discrimination . . . [and] the discrimination manifested itself in hiring

and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as through
entirely subjective decisionmaking processes."" Because the plaintiffs in Dukes did not allege a biased testing procedure, they had to
offer "significant proof" that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination and that the discrimination manifested itself in
similar hiring and promotion practices.
Dukes, however, did not allege that Wal-Mart had an explicit corporate policy against the advancement of women.12 Rather, she alleged
that local managers' discretion over pay and promotions had been exercised disproportionately in favor of men, resulting in an unlawful
disparate impact on women.1 3 She sought class certification on the
theory that "a strong and uniform 'corporate culture' [had] permit[ted] bias against women to infect . .. the discretionary decision-

making of each one of Wal-Mart's thousands of managers-thereby
making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.""
The Court was skeptical. "On its face," the Court explained, a policy of delegating discretionary decisionmaking authority to local supervisors is "just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that
would" satisfy the Rule 23 commonality requirement.' 5 Indeed, companies often permit discretionary decisionmaking so as "to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard."'"
The Court was careful to acknowledge that such a "policy" could
give rise to Title VII liability under a disparate-impact theory and that
such a case could conceivably be litigated on a classwide basis-but
only where the plaintiffs could identify "a common mode of exercising
discretion that pervade[d] the entire company."" In other words, the
plaintiffs would have to offer "significant proof" that all managers had
exercised their discretion in a common way.1 8
11. Id. at 2553 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15
(1982)).
12. Dukes could not have alleged as much. As the Court underscored, Wal-Mart
had an express corporate policy against gender discrimination. Id.
13. Id. at 2548; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(k) (2011).
14. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
15. Id. at 2554.
16. Id. at 2553.

17. Id. at 2554-55.
18. Id.
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That is a staggering burden, and the plaintiffs in Dukes did not carry
it." Dukes and fellow named plaintiffs Christine Kwapnoski and
Edith Arana offered sociological, statistical, and anecdotal evidence
to support their claims. But this evidence fell far short of demonstrating that thousands of managers across thousands of Wal-Mart stores
had exercised their discretion in a common way. Indeed, how could
one make such a demonstration at the class certification stage in the
absence of an express corporate policy?
B.

23(b)(2) and Claims for Monetary Relief

After the Court concluded that the Dukes plaintiffs had not proffered a common question, it moved on to address whether the Ninth
Circuit had properly certified their claims for backpay under Rule
23(b)(2), which allows class treatment when "the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." 20 The Court pointed
out that one could interpret the Rule to mean that it authorized only
injunctive or declaratory relief.2 ' But the Court did not reach that
broader question, because it determined that claims for individualized
relief-like backpay-do not satisfy the rule: "the key to the (b)(2)
class is 'the individualized nature of the injunctive or declaratory relief
warranted-the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined
or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none
of them.' "22
The plaintiffs contended that their claims for backpay were appropriately certified under 23(b)(2) because they did not "predominate"
over their claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.2 3 in support of
their argument, they cited the Advisory Committee's statement that
Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final
relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages." 24 Because the plaintiffs' claims for relief did not "relate exclusively or
predominantly" to backpay, they must satisfy Rule 23(b)(2)'s requirements. The Court rejected this "negative-inference" argument.
First, the Rule itself, and not the Advisory Committee's interpretation
19. Id. at 2553 ("'[S]ignificant proof' that Wal-Mart 'operated under a general policy of discrimination' . . . is entirely absent here.").

20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
21. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
22. Id. (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate
Proof,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)). The Court explained that (b)(2) is meant to
capture, for example, "[c]ivil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, classbased discrimination." Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
614 (1997)).
23. Id. at 2559.

24. Id.
25. Id.
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of it, would govern its determination.26 Second, to accept the plaintiffs' argument would "do violence to [Rule 23's] structural features."2 7 Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) allow class litigation where
individual adjudication would be impossible or where relief sought
would affect the entire class at once. These are thus mandatory classes with no notice or opt-out provisions. Rule 23(b)(3), on the other
hand-an "adventuresome innovation" that allows class litigation
under a wider set of circumstances-provides for notice, allows potential class members to opt out, and requires that "questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."2 8 Where class claims for relief include individualized claims
for money, a judge must make findings about predominance and superiority before certifying the class, and potential class members must be
given notice and opt-out rights.
Last, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that their claims
for backpay were merely "incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief" under Allison v. Citgo Petroleum.30 The Fifth Circuit
held in Allison that where claims for monetary relief "flow directly
from liability to the class as a whole," there should be "no need for
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual's
case" and thus such claims could be subjected to classwide litigation
under 23(b)(2). 3 Without deciding whether there were, in fact, any
forms of "incidental" monetary relief that satisfied the requirements
of 23(b)(2), the Court pointed out that the Title VII remedial scheme
entitled Wal-Mart to individualized determinations of each employee's eligibility for backpay; that a "Trial by Formula"-whereby
an average backpay award would be determined for a sample set of
class members and then extrapolated to other members-would not
substitute for such determinations; and thus that the Dukes class could
not be certified "even assuming" incidental monetary relief could be
awarded to a 23(b)(2) class. 3 2

26. Id.
27. Id
28. Id. at 2558 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 614); FED. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3).
29. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2258-59.
30. Id. at 2560 (citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir.
1998)).
31. Id. at 2560-61.
32. Id. at 2561.
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Ginsburg's Dissent: Must 23(a)(2) Mean More Than it Says?

Justice Ginsburg's vehement dissent33 argued that the majority improperly "disqualifie[d] the class at the starting gate" by "import[ing]
into the Rule 23(a) determination concerns [such as whether questions of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individuals] properly addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) assessment."" Ginsburg
criticized the majority for insisting that 23(a)(2) "must mean more
than it says:" "[s]ensibly read, . . . the word 'questions' means disputed
issues." 5
Under this "sensible" reading of 23(a)(2), the purported class raises
such a disputed issue, or poses such a common question: "whether
Wal-Mart's pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination." 6 Indeed, scholars have long described Rule 23(a)(2) as easily satisfied.
But the majority's "rigorous analysis" raised the bar, so to speak:
The Court's emphasis on differences between class members mimics
the Rule 23(b)(3)

inquiry

into whether

common questions

"predominate" over individual issues. And by asking whether the

individual differences "impede" common adjudication, . . . the

Court duplicates 23(b)(3)'s question whether "a class action is superior" to other modes of adjudication. Indeed, Professor Nagareda,
whose "dissimilarities" inquiry the Court endorses, developed his

position in the context of Rule 23(b)(3).

The Rule requires a "common question," but the majority articulated
a higher standard: a common question that will resolve the case. The
majority, citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,3 insisted that its position was not new-but the subsequent flood of motions to decertify predicated upon Dukes suggests otherwise.

III.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DUKEs DECISION

A.

The Blurring of 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3)

The requirements of 23(a)(2) seem straightforward and easily satisfied. The Rule requires that would-be class representatives pose
33. Id. Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurs in
part-that the purported class could not have been certified as a 23(b)(2) class-and
dissents in part, but the bulk of the opinion assails the commonality standard established by the majority. Id. at 2561-62.
34. Id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As the cases that follow will show, many
district courts continue to consider such concerns in Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3)
assessments.
35. Id. at 2562 n.3.
36. Id. at 2564.
37. 5 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.23[2], 23-72 (3d ed.
2011).
38. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566.
39. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
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"questions of law or fact common to the class.""0 The use of the conjunction "or"-used to link alternatives, of course-makes the rule
seem even less intimidating. Plaintiffs must pose common questions
of law or fact-they need not pose common questions of law and fact.
As Professor Nagareda has explained, "[e]ven a single question of law
or fact common to the members of the class will satisfy the commonality requirement."4 1
Justice Ginsburg's dissent emphasizes that the commonality requirement is clear, unambiguous, straightforward, and meant to be
"easily satisfied."4 2 She cites dictionary definitions of "question" ("[a]
subject or point open to controversy"), "question of fact" ("[a] disputed issue to be resolved .. . [at] trial"), and "question of law" ("[a]n

issue to be decided by the judge") and concludes that a common question "must be a dispute, either of fact or of law, the resolution of
which will advance the determination of the class members' claims.""
Given that reading of the rule, it is difficult to see why the Dukes
plaintiffs did not meet the commonality threshold. As Justice Ginsburg asserts, the question "whether Wal-Mart's pay and promotions
policies gave rise to unlawful discrimination[ ] was hardly infirm."4 4
Justice Scalia suggests that Justice Ginsburg's plain interpretation of
the Rule is too "easy," a "misread[ing]," "since any competently
crafted class complaint literally raises common 'questions."'4 5 He recites a series of questions that will not satisfy the commonality standard: "Do all of us plaintiffs indeed work for Wal-Mart? Do our
managers have discretion over pay? Is that an unlawful employment
practice? What remedies should we get?"4 6 These are straw men.
One need not be an expert on aggregate litigation to detect the differences between the questions above-as Justice Ginsburg put it, mere
"utterance[s] crafted in the grammatical form of a question"-and the
Dukes plaintiffs' question. It is obvious that these questions do not
satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality standard. But it is not at all
obvious that the Dukes plaintiffs' question does not. By way of explanation, Justice Scalia uses language that complicates the Rule and
makes its requirements more difficult to satisfy.
The language in the Dukes opinion most often cited by lower courts
engaged in a commonality analysis is that plaintiffs' "claims must depend upon a common contention [that] . . . must be of such a nature
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
41. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLuM. L. REV. 149, 176 n.110 (2003).
42. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). One would think that
Justice Scalia, well known for his ardent adherence to the plain text of rules and statute, would embrace such a definition.
44. Id. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2551.
46. Id.
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that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."4 7 This is a vibrant
metaphor-one envisions a gleaming swordsman felling trees "in one
stroke"-but not terribly useful to a commonality analysis. Unsurprisingly, courts struggle with the meaning of the statement. Most
often, they simply reproduce it and follow it with "in other words" and
a quotation from Professor Nagareda's Class Certification in the Age
48
of Aggregate Proof.
The Eighth Circuit, for example, concluded that
the statement meant that "a proponent of certification [must] show
that a classwide proceeding [would] 'generate common answers apt to
drive the resolution of the litigation,"' 4 9 and the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that the statement required courts to determine "whether classwide proceedings
have the capacity to 'generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.'"50
The requirement that "common questions" be able to generate
"common answers" is certainly more succinct than the sword metaphor, but not necessarily more helpful. What exactly is a "common
answer" to a Rule 23(a)(2) common question? If the common question is, for example, whether Company X had an unofficial policy of
requiring its employees to work overtime without additional pay in
violation the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), is the common answer to that question "yes, Company X had such an unofficial policy
in violation of the FLSA" or "no, Company X did not have such an
unofficial policy?" Must a court weighing certification essentially decide the merits of plaintiffs' claims?
Not quite-but almost. Many courts cite Dukes for the proposition
that a commonality analysis requires courts to engage in a "rigorous
analysis" to ensure "that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been
satisfied" and that the rigorous analysis frequently "entails some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs' underlying claims."" The rigorous analysis demands that courts probe behind the pleadings in search
of dissimilarities that may hinder class litigation of the plaintiffs'
claims. Without common proof, one cannot expect common answers-and common answers drive the resolution of class litigation.
Justice Scalia's sword metaphor, then, is interpreted to mean that a
23(a)(2) "common question" must be able to generate "common answers," and courts in search of common answers must conduct a rigor47. Id.

48. Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 814 (8th Cir. 2011); Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 2011); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL 205875, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 877 F. Supp. 2d 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
49. Bennett, 656 F.3d at 814.

50. Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 205875, at *4.
51. Bennett, 656 F.3d at 814.
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ous analysis to ensure that there is common proof-that is, they must
probe behind the pleadings in search of dissimilarities that might impede class treatment of the plaintiffs' claims.
It is this characterization of the rigorous analysis that most troubles
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Subjecting a plaintiff's class claims to a rigorous analysis is nothing new. The Court in
Dukes cites Falcon for that proposition. But Dukes requires that common issues predominate: "[tihe Court's emphasis on differences between class members mimics the Rule 23(b)(3) inquiry into whether
common questions 'predominate' over individual issues. And by asking whether the individual differences 'impede' common adjudication
... the Court duplicates 23(b)(3)'s question whether 'a class action is
superior' to other modes of adjudication."5 2 This is problematic for
two reasons. First, if courts must unearth dissimilarities at the
23(a)(2) stage, "no mission remains for Rule 23(b)(3)."a Second,
conducting a rigorous search for dissimilarities at the 23(a)(2) stage
may serve to bar a 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class, neither of which has a
predominance requirement.
Courts' certification decisions since Dukes bear out Justice Ginsburg's argument. In Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's decision to certify a
settlement class of De Beers diamond purchasers." The plaintiffs, direct and indirect purchasers of De Beers diamonds, alleged that De
Beers coordinated the worldwide sale of diamonds by executing output-purchase agreements with competitors, synchronizing and setting
production limits, and restricting the resale of diamonds within certain
geographic regions, all in violation of state and federal antitrust
laws." De Beers argued that the purported class failed to satisfy the
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement because some class members were entirely without a cognizable legal claim-the result of differences among the state statutes governing class members' claims."
"A necessary corollary" of the commonality standard established by
Dukes, De Beers argued, is that "for there to be any common questions, all class members must have at least some colorable legal
claim:" "[o]therwise, it is nonsense to speak of 'resolv[ing] an issue
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims.""' De Beers
52. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 308 (3d Cir. 2011).
56. Id. at 286.
57. More specifically, De Beers argued that the existence of substantive variations
in state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment laws should preclude a
court from finding that common issues predominated as required by 23(b)(3). Id. at
297. Some members of the nationwide settlement class, then, might be said to have
no "colorable legal claim" with respect to one or more of the class claims because
their state does not provide for a cause of action for those particular injuries.
58. Id. at 344 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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repudiated the plaintiffs' argument that it is enough that each class
member have some pleaded claim, again citing Dukes: "Rule 23 does
not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must ... prove that there are in fact . .. common questions of law
or fact. . . . [S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe

behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question."" It follows, then, that district courts must conduct an inquiry
into the existence or validity of each class member's claim.o
The court disagreed, characterizing De Beers's argument as a "misreading" of Dukes." Dukes, the court asserted, does not require district courts to determine whether each class member has a cognizable
legal claim.6 2 Rather, Dukes requires district courts to determine
whether the defendant's conduct was common as to all class members:
''commonality is satisfied where common questions generate common
answers 'apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.'"' And that, the
court held, was exactly the situation presented in the case at bar." De
Beers's anticompetitive conduct resulted in a common injury to all
class members-inflated diamond prices-in violation of federal antitrust law and the antitrust laws of every state:
Based upon our case law, we can distill that each class member
shares a similar legal question arising from whether De Beers engaged in a broad conspiracy that was aimed to and did affect diamond prices in the United States. Evidence for this legal question
would entail generalized common proof as to the implementation of
De Beers's conspiracy, the form of the conspiracy, and the duration
and extent of the conspiracy.6 5

What is most interesting about Sullivan for the purposes of this Article is that the defendants drew heavily upon Dukes in crafting their
defense-despite the fact that 23(a)(2) commonality was not at issue
in the case. De Beers clearly believed that Dukes-though it focused
almost exclusively on 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(2)-was relevant to a
23(b)(3) predominance analysis, which bolsters Justice Ginsburg's argument that the Dukes commonality assessment mimics a 23(b)(3)
predominance assessment.
Moreover, the court's opinion in Sullivan shifts back and forth uncomfortably between discussing "predominance" and "commonality."
The two standards-meant to be separate and distinct-blur. Though
commonality was not at issue in the case, the court frequently writes
59. Id. at 344-45 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).
60. Id. at 346 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 299.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 299-300. ("[T]he answers to questions about De Beers's alleged misconduct and the harm it caused would be common as to all of the class members, and
would thus inform the resolution of the litigation . . . .").
65. Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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of "commonality," "common questions," "common answers," and
"generalized common proof.""6 And the court, too, seems to believe
that Dukes is relevant to a 23(b)(3) analysis; it cites again and again
from the case in making its determination as to predominance and
superiority.
The blurring of the commonality and predominance standards is
problematic because it makes prediction difficult. Have the two standards disappeared, replaced by one "predominance of common questions" standard? Must a plaintiff prepare to satisfy the predominance
requirement at the 23(a)(2) stage?
Kottaras v. Whole Foods Market, Inc. raises the same questions. In
that case, the United States District Court for the District of D.C. denied the plaintiff's motion to certify a class of Los Angeles County
Whole Foods shoppers." The plaintiff, a patron of Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Market, alleged that a merger between the two
grocery chains raised prices on certain products in violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act.68 In Kottaras,as in Sullivan, 23(a)(2) was not at
issue. Defendant Whole Foods argued that the purported class failed
to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement. The court
agreed, holding that "an essential element of the plaintiff's case-that
is, injury to individual members of the class-[could not] be proven
through classwide evidence . . . ."I'

The court in Kottaras began by delineating the legal standard articulated in Dukes: when determining whether to certify a class under
Rule 23, a court must engage in a "rigorous analysis," and this analysis
frequently entails an examination of "the merits of the plaintiffs underlying claim."o The court interpreted this to mean that district
courts must "scrutinize the probative value of evidence offered with
respect to whether the requirements for class certification have been
met."" The court then expressly rejected the "lenient" legal standard
for class certification under 23(b)(3) articulated in In re Nifedipine
Antitrust Litigation. In that case, the D.C. Circuit asserted that district
courts could refuse to scrutinize the probative value of evidence proffered to demonstrate the requirements of Rule 23.72 This "low hurdle," the court concluded, was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Dukes."
In Kottaras, the plaintiff's evidence failed to satisfy the more demanding standard established by Dukes. The plaintiff's expert stated,
first, that by analyzing pricing data for each item's stock-keeping unit
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See, e.g., id. at 299-300.
Kottaras v. Whole Food Mkt., Inc., 281 F.R.D. 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20-21; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).

71. Kottaras, 281 F.R.D. at 22.
72. Id. at 21.

73. Id. at 22.
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(or "SKU"), he would be able to show that members of the class were
injured by the merger and, second, that by using a regression analysis
that controlled for other factors that might affect prices, he could determine how much of the overcharge for a particular product was due
to the merger. But the court accepted the defendant's argument
that Whole Foods shoppers buy "highly differentiated baskets of
products" and that, in fact, "the majority of products sold at Whole
Foods have decreased in price" in the post-merger period. Thus, determining whether and which Whole Foods customers were actually
harmed by the merger would require an individualized inquiry into
"the items purchased by each consumer and the changes in price of
each item." 75 Because individual, rather than common, evidence was
required to show adverse impact to the class, the plaintiff did not satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement.7 6
Kottaras, then, serves not only as another example of a court using
Dukes in the 23(b)(3) context and blurring the commonality and predominance standards but also as an example of the Dukes dissimilarities approach in action. In Kottaras, of course, the court actually is
engaging in a 23(b)(3) analysis-but the focus on "differentiated baskets" and "individualized inquiry into items purchased" looks very
like the Court's approach in Dukes. Finally, the court in Kottaras asserts that Dukes did away with the too "lenient" standard for class
certification under 23(b)(3) articulated in In re Nifedipine Antitrust
Litigation. This is significant: Dukes-which focused almost exclusively on 23(a)(2), heretofore an "easily satisfied" standard construed
permissively by courts-made the 23(b)(3) predominance and superiority requirements more difficult to satisfy.
These precedents bear out Justice Ginsburg's argument that the
Dukes emphasis on differences between class members mimics a Rule
23(b)(3) assessment. They also give some foundation to her prediction that (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes which, traditionally, need not have
satisfied predominance or superiority requirements, may now have to
meet those bars in order to secure certification. In Connor B. v. Patrick, for example, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts denied the defendants' motion to decertify a 23(b)(2)
class of children who were or would be in the foster care custody of
the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families ("DCF") as a
result of abuse or neglect.7 7 The plaintiffs alleged that "overarching
systemic deficiencies" within DCF-including excessive caseloads, inadequate supervision and monitoring of providers, and inadequate
caseworker and supervisor training-exposed the children in DCF
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 25.
Connor B. ex reL Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D 30, 31 (D. Mass. 2011).
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custody to potential harm." The defendants argued for decertification on the grounds that Dukes had "changed the standards for class
certification" and that the purported class no longer satisfied the Rule
23(a) commonality requirement and 23(b)(2) cohesiveness requirement." The court disagreed, asserting that Dukes had not in fact
changed the law for all class action certifications but rather had only
"provided guidance on how existing law should be applied to expansive, nationwide class actions . . . very different from" the case before

them.s0
The defendants argued, first, that Dukes required the court to go
beyond the pleadings before granting class certification. The court asserted that "at no point in its decision [did the Supreme Court] imply
that rigorous analysis will always require courts to go beyond the
pleadings."" Unlike the plaintiffs' Title VII claims in Dukes, which
demanded an inquiry into "the reason for the particular employment
decision," the alleged violations here "flowed from structural infirmities within a unified child welfare system . . . where there is no requi-

site showing of common intent."82 The defendants next argued, again
pursuant to Dukes, that the dissimilarities among the 8,500 class members in the case-differences in social worker assignments, goals,
physical and mental health needs, and length of stay in DCF custody-made class certification improper. As in Dukes, "class members' alleged harms are caused by individual social workers who
exercise wide discretion in determining what is in the best interest of
the child rather than by a uniform organization policy that dictates
how discretion should be exercised."" The court rejected this argument, too, pointing out that the plaintiffs had alleged specific and
overarching systemic deficiencies within DCF that place children at
risk of harm. "These deficiencies, rather than the discretion exercised
by individual case workers, are the alleged causes of class members'
injuries, because they undermine DCF's ability to timely and effectively implement case workers' decisions"-these are "the glue" that
unites the plaintiffs' claims. Finally, the defendants argued that, under
Dukes, the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(2) requirements because no single injunctive or declaratory relief is possible
where each class member has different needs for DCF services, placements, and visitation. The court held that "any new rules of law that
Dukes may have created for Rule 23(b)(2) class actions were limited
to its specific holding regarding the propriety of claims for monetary
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
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relief." The plaintiffs' claims here were limited to injunctive relief.'
In Connor B., the defendants attempted to use Dukes dissimilarities
approach to bar a 23(b)(2) class-albeit by defeating cohesiveness.
The court did not take the bait-insisting, as few courts have done,
that Dukes did not effect a substantial change in the law.
B. Dukes in the Employment Context
Dukes makes clear that, pursuant to Falcon, an employer's "subjective [pay and] promotion practices" can be subjected to classwide litigation only where the plaintiff employee offers "significant proof"
that the employer operated under "a general policy of discrimination"
and that the "discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion
practices in the same general fashion." 5 In other words, all supervisors must have "exercise[d] discretion in a common way.""6 This is a
staggering, perhaps insurmountable, burden where the plaintiff seeks
to certify a nationwide class. The Court's objection to the anecdotal,
statistical, and sociological evidence offered by the plaintiffs in Dukes
was that it failed to establish the existence of general discriminatory
treatment at the store level." A second, "more fundamental" objection the Court raised to the plaintiffs' evidence was that "[elven if it
established (as it does not) a pay or promotion pattern that differs
from the nationwide figures or the regional figures in all of
Wal-Mart's 3,400 stores, that would still not demonstrate that commonality of issue exists."" Supervisors will give different reasons for
the various pay and promotion decisions they made-and in order to
satisfy Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement, the plaintiff must show
that all supervisors exercised discretion in a common way. In other
words, the plaintiff must show-or at least raise an inference-that
"all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions [were]
discriminatory.""

In Delagarzav. Tesoro Refining & Marketing Co., the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California certified a
84. See also M.D. v. Perry, No. C-11-84, 2011 WL 7047039 (S.D. Tex. July 21,
2011) (denying the defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending appeal of the district court's class certification order). In M.D., the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the Rule 23 commonality requirement "in light of the
recently released Supreme Court decision in [Dukes]." Id. at *1. The court distinguished the case before it from Dukes, concluding that important distinctions between
the two cases mitigated against a stay: "[T]he respondents [in Dukes] wished to sue
about literally millions of employment decisions at once"; here, the "[pilaintiff's
claimed injuries result from the common alleged deficiencies in the Texas foster care
system. Those alleged deficiencies are the 'glue' holding [their] claims together." Id.
85. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011).
86. Id. at 2555.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2556 (emphasis added).
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23(b)(3) class of twelve-hour shift employees at an oil refinery." The
plaintiffs alleged that their employer had a policy that required them
to be on duty at the refinery for the entirety of their shifts, failing to
provide them with required meal periods or extra pay.9 ' The defendant oil refinery argued, pursuant to Dukes, that because there was
diversity within the purported class-that is, because job duties varied
from unit to unit and day to day and because not all members of the
class were subject to the same requirements to remain on the premises-there was no common policy tying all class members together. 9 2
The court rejected this argument, characterizing the defendant's reliance on Dukes as inapposite: "[h]ere,... Plaintiffs allege a specific set
of practices . . . . Plaintiffs contend, and the evidence indicates, the
challenged policy applies to all members of the class . . . with only

exceptional variations."" Thus the court held that the purported class
satisfied the commonality requirement. 94
And in Ross v. RBS Citizens, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to certify a 23(b)(3) class of current and former
employees of Charter One Bank who were subject to the bank's allegedly unlawful compensation policies of failing to pay overtime compensation." The plaintiffs alleged that the bank had a policy of failing
to pay overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty per
work week.' The defendants argued that the purported class failed to
satisfy the Dukes standard of commonality." But the court rejected
this argument. Here, as in Delagarza,there was a "policy . .. denying

certain employees overtime pay that was lawfully due."" The fact
that the policy was "unofficial" or that "there were slight variations in
how Charter One enforced" the policy was not dispositive: "[t]his unofficial policy is the common answer that potentially drives the resolution of this litigation," "the glue holding together" the class."
90. Delagarza v. Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., No. C-09-5803 EMC, 2011 WL
4017967, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011).
91. Id.
92. Id. at *6. Here the defendant is attempting to make exactly the type of argument that Justice Ginsburg decried in her dissent, that "[d]issimilarities within the
proposed class .. . have the potential to impede the generation of common answers."
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
93. Delagarza, 2011 WL 4017967, at *8.
94. See also Espinoza v. 953 Assocs. LLC, 280 F.R.D. 113, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("Although plaintiffs' claims may raise individualized questions regarding the number
of hours worked and how much each employee was entitled to be paid, those differences go to the damages that each employee is owed, not to the common question of
Defendants' liability. Plaintiffs have alleged a common injury that is capable of classwide resolution without inquiry into multiple employment decisions . . .)
95. Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 905-06 (7th Cir. 2012).
96. Id. at 902.
97. The court characterizes the defendants' interlocutory appeal as an "effort[ ] to
fit the present case into the Dukes mold." Id. at 909.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 909-10.
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The defendants in Delagarza and Ross argued that the purported
classes in each case failed to satisfy the commonality requirement
under Dukes. In each case plaintiffs complained only of "unofficial"
policies-and those were not administered with perfect uniformity.
But district and appellate courts have not extended the reasoning in
Dukes-that where there is not an express company-wide policy,
plaintiffs must show that all individual personnel decisions were discriminatory or in violation of a particular law-to cases such as these.
The courts in Delagarza and Ross found that unofficial company-wide
policies satisfy the standard established by Dukes and also make clear
that perfect uniformity of decision is not required to meet the more
demanding standard.
The courts in Delagarza, Ross, and similar non-Title VII employment cases seem to have little or no difficulty disposing of defendants'
attempts to fit the cases before them into the Dukes mold. But courts
struggle, unsurprisingly, to distinguish Dukes in Title VII cases that
present facts very like those presented in Dukes.
In Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., for example, a federal
magistrate judge recommended that the defendants' motion to strike
the plaintiffs' class claims in light of Dukes be denied.o The plaintiffs
sought to certify a class of former female associates, vice presidents,
and managing directors of Goldman Sachs who, as employees of the
company, had allegedly been subject to gender discrimination and retaliation.' 0 Goldman Sachs argued that the plaintiffs' "central thesis
[was] that Goldman Sachs grant[ed] its managers unbridled discretion
to make compensation, promotion, and assignment decisions" and
that Dukes had effectively extinguished that argument as the basis for
a class action suit. 102 But the magistrate judge underscored that while
Goldman Sachs managers did have discretion with respect to certain
aspects of the pay and promotion process, it was not complete discretion. Goldman Sachs utilized a number of "specific employment practices"-a "360-degree review process," forced quartile-ranking of
employees, and the "tap on the shoulder" system of selecting employees. Managers exercised discretion only within that framework by, for
example, moving an employee to a higher or lower quartile without
regard to review scores. The judge was not willing to conclude, without further discovery, that the combination of these employment practices did not amount to "a common mode of exercising discretion"
under Dukes.10 3 District Judge Leonard Sand agreed.' 0 4
100. Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL
205875, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), affd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F. Supp. 2d 133
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id. at *5.
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And in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision to deny certification to a class of current and former African-American employees
of Merrill Lynch who, as employees of the company, had allegedly
been subject to racial discrimination.o 5 The defendants argued, and
the district court agreed, that the case was like Dukes: Merrill Lynch
delegated discretion over compensation decisions to more than one
hundred "Complex Directors."10 6 But Judge Posner, writing for the
court, pointed out that the Complex Directors exercised discretion
only "within a framework established by the company."' 0 7 Compensation decisions were in fact determined by two company-wide poliThe
cies: a teaming policy and an account distribution policy.'
goal
of
forming
"teams."
The
brokers
to
form
policy
allowed
teaming
a team was to gain access to additional clients or to share clients with
brokers who had complementary skills. Team participation affected
brokers' performance evaluations, which in turn affected their pay
and promotions. The account-distribution policy governed the transfer of customer accounts from departing brokers to other brokers.
Merrill Lynch established criteria for deciding which brokers would
win a competition for the accounts. The criteria included the competing brokers' past performance-influenced heavily by team
participation.
The Merrill Lynch Complex Directors exercised discretion with respect to teaming and account distribution: they could veto teams and
supplement company criteria for distributions. 0 ' Judge Posner, distinguishing Dukes, did not find this fact dispositive:
[T]o the extent that these regional and local managers exercise discretion regarding the compensation of the brokers whom they supervise, the case is indeed like Wal-Mart. But the exercise of that
discretion is influenced by the two company-wide policies ... . The
teams, [the plaintiffs] say, are little fraternities . . ., and as in fraternities the brokers choose as team members people who are like
themselves. If they are white, they, or some of them anyway, are
more comfortable teaming with other white brokers. Obviously
they have their eyes on the bottom line; they will join a team only if
they think it will result in their getting paid more, and they would
doubtless ask a superstar broker to join their team regardless of his
or her race. But there is bound to be uncertainty about who will be
effective in bringing and keeping shared clients; and when there is
104. Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (agreeing with the magistrate judge's conclusion that Goldman's "360-degree review process," forced quartile-ranking of employees, and "tap on the shoulder" system distinguished the case from Dukes).
105. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 483,
488, 492 (7th Cir. 2012).
106. Id. at 488.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 489.
109. Id.
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uncertainty people tend to base decisions on emotions and preconceptions, for want of objective criteria.110
There may be no intentional discrimination at the managerial level,
but the practice of allowing brokers to choose their partners could
enable racial discrimination-i.e., could have a disparate impact. The
court held that "[t]he spiral effect attributable to company-wide policy
and arguably disadvantageous to black brokers presents a question
common to the class.""'
In Bennett v. Nucor, on the other hand, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to deny certification to a class of current
and former employees of a large steel manufacturing company. 12
The plaintiffs alleged that they had been subject to racial discrimination in violation of Title VII." 3 The defendants argued, pursuant to
Dukes, that the purported class failed to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality requirement. The court agreed, leaning heavily on the
district court's finding that employment practices varied substantially
across the steel company's many production departments. Employment at the company was characterized by (1) a decentralized management structure; (2) autonomous production departments; (3) the
operational independence of those departments; (4) a wide variety of
promotion, discipline, and training policies; and (5) "stark" inter-departmental variations in job titles, functions performed, and equipment used.1 14 The plaintiffs argued that a Falcon-like class was
appropriate given the company's "subjective promotion practices,"
but the court disagreed. First, the company's promotion practices
were not entirely subjective-it utilized several objective criteria in
making its pay and promotion determinations, and these criteria varied substantially across departments."' 5 Second, even if the company
did employ "entirely subjective decisionmaking processes" like those
at issue in Falcon, the plaintiffs had failed to present "significant
proof," demanded by Dukes, that the company operated under a general policy of discrimination and that the discrimination manifested
itself in similar hiring and promotion practices-that is, there was no
significant proof that all supervisors exercised their discretion in a
common way.' 1 6
In cases like Chen-Oster and McReynolds, courts have appeared to
scour the record for any indication of a "company-wide policy" that
circumscribes or guides managerial discretion with respect to pay and
promotion determinations. The magistrate judge in Chen-Oster, for
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 490.
Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 807 (8th Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 814-15.
Id. at 815.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol19/iss3/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V19.I3.2

18

Brooks-Crozier: Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-M

2013]

PUT UP YOUR DUKES

729

example, focused on the 360-degree review, quartile ranking, and tapon-the-shoulder processes, and the court in McReynolds focused on
the teaming and account distribution policies. These policies, the
courts reasoned, might very well amount to Dukes's "common mode
of exercising discretion."
But this seems a stretch. If the managers at Goldman Sachs and
Merrill Lynch can exercise discretion in such ways that completely
subvert the so-called company-wide "policy," how is that differentor, at least, meaningfully different-from exercising complete discretion to begin with?"' The magistrate judge in Chen-Oster does not
provide us with a wealth of information on that score-and neither
does Judge Sand."' One could argue that the 360-degree review process is likely to generate large amounts of objective data that might
form the basis of the "significant proof" demanded by Falcon and
Dukes. Every employee at Goldman Sachs receives a raw and adjusted score on the basis of his or her 360-degree review. Managers
may then, at their discretion, move an employee up or down in the
quartile rankings. It should be reasonably easy then, assuming the
data still exists, to determine whether managers move men up in the
rankings at a substantially-that is, statistically significant-greater
rate than they do women. If a plaintiff can show that managers move
men up at a substantially greater rate than they do women, he or she
may have proven a common mode of exercising discretion within the
meaning of Dukes. On the other hand, given the Dukes court's emphasis that "the crux of [a Title VII] inquiry is 'the reason for a particular employment decision""" and the requirement that would-be
class representatives show that all supervisors exercised discretion in a
common way, the 360-review data, especially in the absence of any

117. See Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 118 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (acknowledging that "[i]t is true that an individual manager's decision might be
more or less discretionary" within the framework of the larger employment practices). See also Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 897-98 (7th Cir. 2012)
(distinguishing McReynolds from the case before it and asserting that the litigants in
the case had attempted to "cleverly" use McReynolds "to repackage local variability
as uniformity").
118. Judge Sand merely insists that Dukes does not "doom" classes in cases where
individual managers exercise discretion within the framework of specific employment
practices. Chen-Oster, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011)). Interestingly, Judge Sand goes on to distinguish the
proposed class before him from that in Dukes on the basis of scale or "sheer size." Id.
at 119. The Dukes class numbered in the millions. The Chen-Oster class was much
smaller. This quite clearly suggests that size matters in Title VII aggregate litigationthat a policy of unbridled individual discretion might not doom a small class, where
"the possibility exists that class members' claims will be based on a 'common contention."' Id. (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 and citing Cronas v. Willis Grp. Holdings, Ltd., No. 06 Civ. 15295(RMB), 2011 WL 5007976, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18,
2011)).
119. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
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corporate policy, may be no better than the generalized statistical evidence rejected by the Dukes court.
Judge Posner's reasoning in McReynolds is perhaps more helpful, if
only because more deliberate:
Assume that with no company-wide policy on teaming or account
distribution, but instead delegation to local management of the decision whether to allow teaming and the criteria for account distribution, there would be racial discrimination by brokers or local
managers, like the discrimination alleged in Wal-Mart. But assume
further that company-wide policies authorizing broker-initiated
teaming, and basing account distributions on past success, increase
the amount of discrimination. The incremental causal effect . . . of
those company-wide policies . . . could be most efficiently deter-

mined on a class-wide basis. 12 0
But as in Chen-Oster,the Merrill Lynch managers in McReynolds exercised a kind of veto power over the "policies" at issue, which raises
the same question about how relevant the policies are to the commonality analysis."'
C. Hybrid Classes
Before Dukes, multiple circuits had held that the relief sought by a
23(b)(2) class need not be solely injunctive or declaratory.122 In the
Second Circuit, for example, one could use 23(b)(2) to certify a class
seeking both injunctive and monetary relief if "(1) the positive weight
or value to the plaintiffs of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought
[was] predominant [over the value of the monetary relief] ... and (2)

class treatment would be efficient and manageable."1 2 3 Following
Dukes, defendants have argued that where plaintiffs' claims include
those for individualized relief, Dukes precludes certification of any
portion of the case under 23(b)(2). To counter such arguments, courts
have looked to Rule 23(c)(4), which provides that "[wihen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues." 2 4 Courts have characterized these defendants' arguments as a misreading of Dukes and asserted that the
maintenance of hybrid classes under 23(c)(4) is, as one court put it,
120. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490
(7th Cir. 2012).
121. The search for the Dukes holy grail-that is, the search for a policy to act as
the "glue" holding together myriad decisions that were allegedly harmful to plaintiffs-characterizes Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment class-action litigation cases
post Dukes, too. See, e.g., Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 192-93 (E.D. Tex.
2011); Logory v. Cnty. of Susquehanna, 277 F.R.D. 135, 142 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
122. Easterling v. Conn. Dep't of Correction, 278 F.R.D. 41, 45 (D. Conn. 2011).
123. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2012).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
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"fully consistent with Dukes's careful attention to the distinct procedural protections attending (b)(2) and (b)(3) classes."' 2 5
In Easterling v. Connecticut Department of Correction,for example,
plaintiff Cherie Easterling, a female applicant who had failed to secure a Corrections Officer position with the Connecticut Department
of Correction, alleged that the Department's physical fitness test, administered to all candidates for Corrections Officer positions, had a
disparate impact on female applicants in violation of Title VII. 2 6 The
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted
Easterling's motion for class certification under 23(b)(2) in January
2010-before Dukes.12 After Dukes, the defendant moved the court
to decertify the class given the Dukes holding that claims for individualized relief do not satisfy 23(b)(2).1 2 8 The court denied the defendant's motion and instead modified its earlier certification order,
converting the existing class to a 23(c)(4) hybrid class-maintaining
Rule 23(b)(2) certification with regard to liability and injunctive relief
and certifying a separate 23(b)(3) class with regard to monetary damages and individualized injunctive relief. 12 9
In Chen-Oster, too, defendant Goldman Sachs argued that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs' claims for individualized relief precluded
certification under 23(b)(2).1 3 0 The magistrate judge rejected this argument, citing 23(c)(4) and the Second Circuit's interpretation of it in
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.: 3' "[t]he Second Circuit has
made clear that '[d]istrict courts should take full advantage of Rule
23(c)(4) to certify separate issues in order to reduce the range of disputed issues in complex litigation and achieve judicial efficiencies.'
This especially includes bifurcating class actions with regards to the
issues of liability and damages." 3 2
125. Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL
205875, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), affd in part, rev'd in part, 877 F. Supp. 2d 133
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
126. Easterling v. Conn. Dep't of Correction, 265 F.R.D. 45, 48 (D. Conn. 2010).
127. Id. at 55.

128. Easterling v. Conn. Dep't of Correction, 278 F.R.D. 41, 43 (D. Conn. 2011).
129. Id. at 51. The defendant in Easterling also challenged the certification order
on the grounds that common issues did not predominate over individual issues. Id. at
43-45,47-49. The court found several pressing individual questions: "Each individual
claimant will still need to establish her status as a member of the class in order to
receive a pro rata share of the back-pay award. Additionally, to share in any forwardlooking relief, such as priority hiring or front pay, each claimant would need to establish that she is currently qualified for a CO position. Finally, the court will still need
to consider individual mitigation issues, such as a claimant's interim earnings or failure to mitigate." But the court ultimately held that these individual questions were
"less substantial than the issues that [would] be subject to generalized proof" and
affirmed its earlier decision with respect to predominance. Id. at 50.
130. Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 205875, at *8.
131. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled
in part, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560-62 (2011).
132. Chen-Oster, 2012 WL 205875, at *7.
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CONCLUSION

A review of class-action cases post Dukes makes clear, first, that
defendants regard the case as a promising opportunity to secure
decertification on the grounds that the class opposing them fails to
satisfy the requirements of 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3), or 23(b)(2) and, second,
that the standard for commonality established by Dukes did, in fact,
mimic that for predominance and superiority, thus making 23(a)(2)
substantially more difficult to satisfy than it had been. Further inquiry
is required to determine whether this heightened standard will act to
bar 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) classes at the commonality threshold-a serious problem, given that (b)(2), a rule "which reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial segregation," is intended to
The Supreme Court would do well to
capture civil rights cases.
clarify the Dukes holding, making clear that the 23(a)(2) rigorous
analysis does not require that common issues predominate, thus retaining 23(b)(3)'s particular "mission."
133. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557-58.
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